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ABSTRACT 
This article examines the al-Qaeda movement within the categories of “global” and “local.” Both 
descriptions are relevant. Structurally, the label al-Qaeda is used to describe many things: the 
original al-Qaeda central organization; locally based affiliated groups that operate under its 
banner; and a global social movement of sympathizers and participants connected via the internet. 
Ideologically, the emergence of jihadist doctrine has taken place against the backdrop of social 
change on a global scale and can be convincingly analyzed as a direct symptom of modernity and 
globalization. However, the roots and aims of the movement are local. They pertain to specific 
societies and emerge from widely felt grievances against the state system and the ruling elites of 
the Arab world. As such, the al-Qaeda movement is best viewed as a global expression of local 
grievances: a new “global” strategy in the service of local goals centered on the states of the 
Middle East. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Since 2001, Osama bin Laden’s portrayal of a global war between “Islam” and “the West” has been mirrored by 
several governments’ repeated invocation of a global contest between the forces of “democracy” and “moderation” and 
those of “extremism” and “Islamo-fascism.”1 Such depictions give rise to an interesting question: to what extent might the 
structures, ideology, and aims of the al-Qaeda movement be described as “global?” 
In answering this question, this article argues that al-Qaeda’s armed campaign against the US, declared in 1996 
and later expanded in 1998 to include all “Jews and Crusaders,”2 is far from the simple phenomenon evoked by such 
representations. On the contrary, contemporary transnational radical Islamism is a movement with roots in a complex 
convergence of global and local factors. As will be argued, while the al-Qaedist social movement might well be described 
as “global,” and the movement’s ideology is a product of broad social trends on a global scale, the roots and aims of al-
Qaeda are to be found not in the mythical global “clash of civilizations” but rather at the local state level. 
Structures: Groups 
In the years following the 9/11 attacks, in a bid to attract support for military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq 
from skeptical populations, the US, the UK, and other governments engaged in a rhetorical strategy of aggregation: the 
downplaying of complexity and the repeated invocation of the simplistic dualisms of good versus evil, freedom versus 
tyranny, and democracy versus terrorism. The very idea of a “war on terror” represented a rhetorical device, which at 
every turn sought to portray acts of Islamist violence — whether in Iraq, Palestine, Afghanistan, the UK, or anywhere else 
in the world — as part of a global struggle pitting the forces of progress and modernity (democratic, secular states) against 
those of reaction and barbarity (Islamist groups who use violence). The strategy was expressed in its most striking terms 
by the ethical dualism of George W. Bush with his “good versus evil” / “with us or against us” rhetoric and the merging of 
the issues of Islamist violence, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and “rogue states” in the run-up to the Iraq invasion. 
The UK’s Tony Blair spoke in a similar vein, arguing that “Islamic extremism” represented a powerful monolithic global 
ideology: “The struggle against terrorism in Madrid or London or Paris is the same as the struggle against the terrorist acts 
of Hezbollah in Lebanon or the PIJ in Palestine or rejectionist groups in Iraq. The murder of the innocent in Beslan is part 
of the same ideology that takes innocent lives in Saudi Arabia, the Yemen or Libya.”3  
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The work of Rohan Gunaratna, influential in US policy circles, lent intellectual weight to this approach, 
aggregating a multitude of militant groups under the banner of an organized and hierarchical al-Qaeda, linking Palestinian 
Hamas and Lebanese Hezbollah to bin Laden’s group.4 Vague and general assertions, including that “one in five Muslim 
charities” fund al-Qaeda’s campaign and that “[al-Qaeda’s] networks are intertwined in the socioeconomic, political and 
religious fabric of Muslims living in at least 80 countries,” should, however, be treated with caution.5 We should be wary 
of analyses that seek to combine all armed Islamist groups into one indistinguishable whole. Similarly, we should be wary 
of descriptions of a global operation with disciplined command-and-control structures, especially since much of 
Gunaratna’s source material comes from unnamed “US intelligence sources.”6  
A more helpful approach is disaggregation. Armed Islamist groups must be distinguished on two levels. Most 
importantly, we should highlight the difference between Islamo-nationalist organizations and doctrinaire jihadist groups 
like al-Qaeda. Islamo-nationalist or irredentist groups fight to redeem land from non-Muslim rule or occupation, such as 
Hamas in Palestine, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the mainstream of the Sunni Arab insurgency in Iraq, parts of the insurgency 
in Afghanistan, and other groups in Kashmir, Chechnya, and elsewhere. This type of armed struggle is determined by the 
context (foreign rule or occupation), and it is viewed by its participants as one strategy among others, including political 
participation. Doctrinaire jihadism, in contrast, arises from the belief that all forms of democratic or secular government 
are illegitimate and that “jihad must continue until an Islamic government is ruling according to revealed law.”7 This 
worldview is characterized by a doctrine that prefers violent means over non-violent means (despite the possibility of 
engaging in the latter) and that draws heavily on the revolutionary message of Sayyid Qutb.8 As far as doctrinaire groups 
are concerned, we should distinguish (although this task, as we shall see, is more difficult) between two types: those (the 
vast majority) who continue to view the “near enemy” — state regimes in Muslim-majority countries — as their sole 
target and those jihadists who have followed al-Qaeda’s strategic shift toward targeting the US and its allies.9 
Ideologically, the rejection of democratic norms and the state system lies at the heart of doctrinaire jihadism. It is 
this rejection that distinguishes them most starkly from Islamo-nationalists and gives rise to the enmity between them.10 In 
jihadist ideology the Islamic principle of tawhid — the absolute oneness of God — is redefined and given an all-
embracing significance with clear political ramifications. This idea (as expressed in the Muslim confession of faith “There 
is no god but God”) is regarded by jihadists as proof that Islam rejects all forms of popular sovereignty, democracy, 
constitutions, and parliamentary elections, and that such a rejection is one of the pillars of monotheism. In the words of 
Sayyid Qutb, “Any system in which the final decisions are referred to human beings . . . deifies [them] by designating 
others than God as lords over men . . . reducing others to the status of slaves . . . [and therefore] . . . to proclaim the 
sovereignty of God means to eliminate all human kingship.”11 Since the 1970s, Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda’s chief 
contemporary ideologue, has railed against Islamo-nationalist groups, especially the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, and 
branded them “infidels” and “tools in the hands of tyrants.”12 In fact, he has devoted an entire work to the subject, 
accusing the Brotherhood of transgressing fundamental Islamic principles by recognizing the Egyptian regime, accepting 
democratic principles based on popular sovereignty, and rejecting the jihadist principle that “sovereignty belongs to God 
alone,” i.e., that legitimate political authority can only exist in the form of a theocratic state that implements “revealed 
law.”13  
This dispute around participation, wedded to a rejection of the jihadi principle that violent action is the only way 
to further political aims, was a key factor behind intra-Sunni Islamist armed conflict in Algeria in the 1990s14 and more 
recently in Iraq. In the case of Iraq, in early 2006 the decision of the Iraqi Islamist Party to participate in elections and the 
establishment of the new government enraged doctrinaire jihadis. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi accused the Iraqi Islamic Party 
of “selling the religion . . . in exchange for a parliamentary seat.”15 By mid-2007, facilitated by a new US military strategy 
that explicitly recognized the differences between the Islamo-nationalist mainstream and the doctrinaire jihadi fringe of 
the insurgency (after four years of failing to do so), doctrinaire jihadis in the al-Qaeda mould were being attacked by 
mainstream Islamo-nationalist groups and were being successfully expelled from many parts of the country. The main 
differences between the Islamo-nationalists and the al-Qaedists in Iraq were over political participation, nationalism, and 
the targeting of civilians. As one leading mainstream insurgent put it, “Our mantra is ‘At the end of the rifle comes the 
pen,’” meaning that resistance ultimately has to give way to politics — whereas al-Qaeda’s mantra is “At the end of the 
rifle comes the cannon.”16 
As for the distinction between doctrinaire jihadists focused on “near enemy” targets and those who focus on 
Western targets, such a clear disaggregation is more difficult. Since the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the merging of 
Zarqawi’s group with al-Qaeda central, a trend has emerged of local state-based jihadis — in Iraq, Algeria, Yemen, and 
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Somalia — adopting the al-Qaeda brand name. It remains unclear, however, the extent to which this rebranding 
represents a true strategic shift, i.e., an intent to turn their guns onto the “far enemy” outside the borders of the state or 
whether such rebranding is principally a propaganda move to draw attention onto locally based conflicts by associating 
themselves with “al-Qaeda central” and al-Qaeda in Iraq.17 In Algeria, for example, the ‘merger’ between the GSPC (The 
Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat) and al-Qaeda central to form al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has 
not, at least until now, led to the Algerian organization mounting attacks in Europe or the United States. This has led one 
scholar to remark that in Algeria “the globalisation of jihad means no more than local suicide bombings, echoed by local 
e-propaganda.”18 Even in the case of al-Qaeda in Iraq, targeting over the past eight years has been, and continues to be, 
more focused on Iraqi Shi’ites rather than on US or coalition targets, which reflects the jihadist hope that civil war in Iraq 
might act as a prelude to a regional conflagration between Sunni and Shi’a, and the first step toward achieving their wider 
revolutionary aims in the region.19  
The Social Movement 
Analyses of al-Qaeda as a broad-based and multi-faceted social movement capture the contemporary complexity 
of the phenomenon better than any study focused on organizations. Jason Burke’s analysis, more persuasive and 
independently researched than Gunaratna’s, argues convincingly that even at al-Qaeda’s most organized period in late 
2001, “to see it as a coherent organisation, with ‘tentacles everywhere’ . . . is to misunderstand . . . the nature of Islamic 
radicalism then and now. The contingent, dynamic and local elements of what is a broad and ill-defined movement rooted 
in historical trends of great complexity are lost [in such a description].”20 Anthony Cordesman and Nawaf Obaid agree, 
arguing that al-Qaeda “underwent a fundamental transformation after the US-led war which destroyed al-Qaeda’s 
headquarters in Afghanistan, [changing] from a quasi-command-and-control structure . . . to a more loosely configured 
network based upon individual cells dispersed throughout the world,” making it now more of a “movement” than an 
established organization.21 Burke adds that the most accurate contemporary portrayal of al-Qaeda is of an increasingly 
powerful and influential idea spread via global media, especially the internet.22 This is not to say that in 2010 there no 
longer existed organized groups and structures related to the pre-2001 structures. There are conflicting reports as to what 
extent al-Qaeda central continues to operate effectively, and although there have been some reports of a resurgence post-
2007, the jury is out.23 
Thomas Hegghammer highlights five “main participants” in the post-Iraq War al-Qaeda social movement: the old 
al-Qaeda leadership (i.e., Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri); the religious scholars, or “jihad sheiks,” who lend 
their authority to legitimize violent action; the strategic thinkers “who write about the best way — from a functional point 
of view — to fight the enemy;” the “active militant organisations” affiliated with al-Qaeda, such as “al-Qaeda in Iraq,” 
“al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula,” and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb; and the “grassroot radicals . . . i.e. the 
thousands of anonymous participants on radical Islamist discussions on the Internet.”24 Marc Sageman’s analysis, 
meanwhile, focuses primarily on these “grassroot radicals” who, since the 2003 Iraq invasion, have participated in a 
“leaderless jihad.” This concept refers to the new breed of “freelance” jihadis who mount operations alone (for example, 
Casablanca in 2003, Madrid in 2004, and London in 2005) without any significant physical link to al-Qaeda central.25 
They form part of a network linked much less by any physical contact than before and much more by the collective 
discourse of the several most influential jihadi forums on the internet, described by the author as the “true leader of global 
Islamist terrorism.”26 
The emergence of a loosely linked social movement that thrives in the online world is partly the result of a 
deliberate jihadist strategy to create the conditions in which operations could be carried out by clandestine networks 
protected from detection by the absence of physical connections to other groups or to an organized leadership. Indeed, 
several prominent jihadist strategists have advocated this approach.27 One of the most influential among them, Abu-
Mus’ab al-Suri, published his decentralization theory in 2004 in his Call for a Global Islamic Resistance, in which the 
idea of a “leaderless jihad” is a prominent theme. Formulated as a way of responding to expanded counterterrorism 
policies post 9/11 — the targeting of financial resources, the assassination of jihadi leaders, military attacks on safe 
havens, and international security cooperation — al-Suri advocates a system whereby groups form from the bottom up 
among friends inspired by media propaganda, especially via the internet. Such a system would, he theorizes, maximize 
both the geographic spread of operations and support and their effectiveness, making them less visible to security and 
intelligence organizations.28 In terms of jihadi doctrine, the decentralized model is grounded in the radical Islamist 
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assertion (and one of the ideological pillars of the al-Qaeda movement) that jihad (interpreted as armed action) is an 
individual duty incumbent upon all Muslims who are able to carry it out.29 
Ideology: An Omnivorous Doctrine 
Explanations abound for the rise of the ideology of doctrinaire jihadism or what might today be called al-
Qaedism. Some place al-Qaeda in a long line of radical movements dating back to the Middle Ages and beyond, across 
the span of Islamic history.30 At the other end of the spectrum, another tendency has been to point out the ideological debt 
al-Qaeda owes to modern European revolutionary movements, most notably anarchism, communism, and fascism.31 
Other academics, writing from a political science perspective, place al-Qaedism at the end of a Sunni Islamist spectrum, 
emerging as a radical off-shoot from mainstream political Islam as articulated by twentieth-century theorists such as 
Mawdudi, al-Banna, and Qutb. These works emphasize the role of ideas emerging from nationalist, anti-colonialist, and 
reformist movements like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the Jamaat-e-Islami in Pakistan.32 Another well-known, 
but rather partial, analysis focuses entirely on the role of Saudi Wahhabism.33 Others combine these factors more 
convincingly, describing al-Qaeda as a “symbiosis” and a “disconcerting encounter” between Egyptian revolutionary 
Islamism and Saudi fundamentalism and correctly assigning more weight to the revolutionary Islamist current.34 Taking 
the symbiosis thesis further, Burke argues that the power and attraction of al-Qaedism lies in its eclecticism, combining as 
it does so many trends from within Islamic tradition — “millenarian, fundamentalist, reformist, revivalist, Wahhabi/Salafi 
and . . . Islamist.” Furthermore, he suggests that “a key element of the success of their discourse is that it combines so 
many elements of preceding ideologies.”35  
All of these explanations make useful contributions to our understanding of the phenomenon. Perhaps the most 
striking characteristic that emerges from this body of literature, as reflected in the wide range of analyses and 
explanations, is the “omnivorous” nature of doctrinaire jihadi thought.36 One of the most persuasive analyses of al-
Qaedism, Faisal Devji’s Landscapes of the Jihad, sees it as an ill-defined ideological composite, or syncretism, that 
should be analyzed as a direct symptom, not of any local tradition, but rather of modernity and globalization themselves.37  
Fragmentation of Religious Authority 
The existence and influence of radical jihadist ideology is one symptom of a pervasive phenomenon that has 
affected the Muslim world in the modern era: the demise of traditional institutions of Islamic jurisprudence over two 
centuries and the resulting erosion of religious authority. A convincing argument can be made for a direct link between 
the decline of classical Islamic law and theology as expressed by the traditional institutions of Islamic jurisprudence and 
the rise of essentialist and ahistorical interpretations of the holy texts.38 From this perspective, the reason why people like 
bin Laden are able to obtain the status of a religious authority in the eyes of their followers and to issue fatwas in the 
fashion of trained Islamic scholars despite their lack of credentials is that they operate within a long-standing and growing 
vacuum of religious authority. Leading Islamic legal scholar Khaled Abou El Fadl has written about the advent of what he 
calls “vulgarized” interpretations of Islam by reference to processes of “individualization” brought about by the 
dissolution of the classical Islamic legal tradition during the European colonial period, the subsequent sudden and 
traumatic birth of the modern nation-state, and the co-opting of religious authority by centralized state power, often 
characterized by despotism and corruption.39 
The thrust of this analysis is that the erosion of Islamic jurisprudence over more than a century has brought about 
a democratization (almost a protestantization) effect where unqualified laypersons from outside the juridical tradition are 
empowered as legitimate interpreters of the word of God and revivalist movements emerge emphasizing direct contact 
between individuals and scripture without recourse to the clergy. This idea is as destabilizing as it is liberating, for 
although the view that any individual is as qualified to interpret the scriptures as any other does not, in itself, lead directly 
to radical conclusions, it does allow those with political agendas to abuse the texts, picking and choosing those words that 
support their cause and ignoring in the process centuries of traditional exegesis. In doing so, they promote literalist, 
ahistorical interpretations, which in turn encourage black-and-white thinking. In this regard, Abou El Fadl observes that 
“Islamic law and theology have become the extracurricular hobby of pamphlet readers and writers . . . [who] . . . have 
reduced the Islamic heritage to the lowest common denominator . . .  a vehicle for displays of power.”40 More recently, the 
role of the internet in this process has been examined. Sageman stresses the egalitarian nature of contributions in chat 
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rooms on the internet, where each opinion appears as authoritative as another and where no one’s contribution can be 
silenced.41 
Further influencing these trends is what has been referred to as “the objectification of Muslim consciousness” in 
the post-colonial era. As Dale Eikelman and James Piscatori theorize, over the past half-century, the advent of mass 
education and mass communications in Muslim-majority states has given rise to a process whereby, more and more, large 
numbers of believers start to meditate on certain questions: “‘What is my religion?’ ‘Why is it important to my life?’ and 
‘How do my beliefs guide my conduct?’” In this way, long-held and taken-for-granted truths are opened up to 
examination and religion is increasingly seen as “a self-contained system that its believers can describe, characterize, and 
distinguish from other such systems.”42 
The fragmentation of religious authority within Muslim-majority societies over the past two centuries is one of 
the most significant consequences of the dramatic social, political, and technological changes of the modern era, and it is a 
process that continues. Another facet of these processes is the geographic spread of Islamic practice brought about by 
migration. Both Olivier Roy and Jocelyne Cesari have written extensively about the nature of religious practice when 
removed from its traditional geographic and social context and emphasize the “individualization” of interpretation that 
results from such a shift.43 The argument follows that when religion no longer has social authority, it falls upon the 
individual to formulate what it means to be a Muslim. Cesari observes, “to be a Muslim in Europe . . . means to lose one’s 
relationship to Islam as a cultural and social fait accompli, and instead to open it up to questioning and individual 
choice.”44  Roy, meanwhile, notes that the reformulation of Islam in the absence of social authority leads to a quest to 
discover a “pure” Islam, “delinked from any specific culture,” a project seen as one of loss — “an impoverishment of 
Islam . . . divorced from inherited cultural habits and collateral knowledge.”45  Although the link between extremism and 
the “deterritorialization of Islam” is debatable and perhaps overstated, evidence does suggest that the difficulties 
confronting those living as a minority, including the overwhelming dominance of the majority culture, socio-economic 
marginalization, and racism, can contribute to a social context in which a small minority seeks refuge in radical doctrines, 
and the comforting certainties of a black-and-white world, where good versus evil, belief versus unbelief, Islam versus the 
West.46   
More broadly, the fragmentation of religious authority brought about by the demise of traditional institutions, 
objectification, migration, and new communication technologies has heightened the trend of Islam being viewed as one 
ideology among other competing ideologies (such as secularism, democracy, socialism, etc.) and the resulting ascendance 
of Islam as a political manifesto that challenges the status quo and offers solutions to contemporary ills.47  
Doctrinaire jihadists are an extremist fringe within Islamism, and Islamists are a tiny minority among Muslims, 
but they are a product of the same historical forces that have shaped the Muslim world and Islamic belief and practice 
over the last 200 years. In al-Qaedism, according to Devji, the demise of the classical legal tradition has opened the door 
to “personalized . . . non-traditional interpretations of Scripture [which] draw upon the flotsam and the jetsam of received 
ideas and remembered histories spanning the Muslim tradition.”48 These are arbitrary sets of beliefs and practices 
employed according to the demands of circumstance and need;49 they are disparate ideologies that “depend upon the 
disintegration of traditional Muslim narratives and chronologies, as much as of modern theories of ideology and 
revolution.”50 Thus, while dismissing “hypocrite imams” and warning young Muslims not to listen to their clerics, bin 
Laden and al-Zawahiri play the part of religious scholars, arguing that the contemporary political predicament of “the 
Muslim nation” demands revolutionary action from every individual, among which the deliberate targeting of civilians is 
permitted in the name of religion.51 As one scholar notes, such justifications are “not based on the main schools of Islamic 
theology, but a new ideological starting point that provides Al Qaeda with a theoretical legitimisation for non-
discriminatory, violent action.”52 
Abusing the Texts 
The defining case of how doctrinaire jihadi ideology uses personalized interpretations divorced from legal 
tradition is in its interpretation of the concept of jihad itself. Particularly vulnerable to abuse, the doctrine of jihad as 
armed struggle (as opposed to its other meaning of an internal spiritual struggle) has long been a contentious issue. 
Indeed, there is no single authoritative voice in the Islamic tradition that has imposed its interpretation universally. The 
question of armed struggle, and in which circumstances it is legitimate, has been debated hotly by the four schools of 
Islamic jurisprudence for centuries.53 The Koranic prescriptions on war are quite general, calling on Muslims to “fight in 
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the way of God,” establish justice, and refrain from disproportionate or unjust actions while fighting; mainstream Islamic 
scholarship tends to interpret jihad as self-defence or a “just war” only to be undertaken collectively and under certain 
carefully defined circumstances, typically in the defence of a country that has been invaded or occupied.54  
The doctrinaire jihadi movement has exploited this vagueness to impose its own view. Drawing on the ideas of 
thirteenth-century scholar Ibn Taymiyyah (whose worldview was shaped by the cataclysm of the Mongol invasions), 
modern jihadist intellectuals have resurrected the idea of an obligation on all individual Muslims to wage war against all 
regimes not considered sufficiently Islamic.55 Ibn Taymiyyah’s fatwa proclaimed firstly that jihad was no longer to be 
considered as a collective obligation undertaken by a head of state in defence of occupied territory but rather as an 
individual duty and an offensive weapon against ‘apostate rulers,’ and secondly, that such a duty was to be considered the 
highest form of devotion. Six centuries later, Sayyid Qutb (perhaps the single most important intellectual source for the 
al-Qaedist movement)56 again denounced traditional understandings of jihad and, drawing on Ibn Taymiyyah, offered his 
own interpretation. As Fawaz Gerges explains, “Far from viewing jihad as a collective duty governed by strict regulations 
(similar to just war theory in Christianity, international law, and classical Islamic jurisprudence or fiqh), jihad for Qutb 
was a permanent revolution against internal and external enemies who usurped God’s sovereignty . . . he dared to 
neutralize the entire body of traditional fiqh and provided jihadis with direct access to the original texts, which they used 
as weapons against ‘impious regimes’.”57  
Jihadi ideologues readily drop the main corpus of Islamic theology, adapting Islamic principles in an ad hoc 
fashion to accord with their perspective on contemporary politics. Indeed, if the circumstances in which jihad could be 
declared were radically reconfigured by jihadists, so were the actions considered legitimate in the course of such an armed 
struggle. That the deliberate targeting of civilians is considered un-Islamic by the vast majority of Muslim scholars and 
Islamist activists was made clear in the days after the 9/11 attacks.58 Al-Qaeda’s religious justification for 9/11, published 
in 2002, therefore, marked a clear departure from traditional thinking and a stark rejection of mainstream scholarship. 
Effectively, they argue that there is no unconditional prohibition against killing civilians in Islam and that under certain 
conditions (which in their view had been met) civilians can be deliberately targeted. Despite overwhelming opinion to the 
contrary among the vast majority of Muslim scholars (condemned by doctrinaire jihadists as “mouthpieces for Arab 
regimes” and “apostates”), al-Qaeda once again imposed its own interpretation of the scriptures to justify its standpoint. 
Chief among these justifications is the citation of Koranic verses that stress reciprocity in war: “And one who attacks you, 
attack him in like manner as he attacked you.”59 In the contemporary jihadist view of global politics — an existentialist 
war between Islam and disbelief — the evidence points to a clear conclusion: “If the unbelievers have targeted Muslim 
women, children and elderly [as they are seen to have done in Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere], it is 
permissible for Muslims to respond in kind.”60 In an ad hoc approach, other Koranic verses are identified in order to argue 
that further conditions have been met to justify purposefully targeting civilians, among which are “assistance of civilians 
in deed, word, or mind” (i.e., the responsibility of citizens in a democratic state for the actions of its government) and the 
inability to distinguish civilians from combatants in battle.61 As Quinton Wikorowicz and John Kaltner argue, “the sheer 
breadth of these justifications leaves ample theological justification for killing civilians in almost any imaginable 
situation.”62  
Aims: Global Identities and the “Clash of Civilizations” Myth 
The modern era has also encouraged a resurgence of the idea of a worldwide Muslim nation or umma. The feeling 
of a shared identity across borders is one felt by many Muslims and is influenced by the doctrine of tawhid.63 In recent 
decades, globalized media, mass education, and migration have contributed to an intensification of this transnational 
sentiment. There is nothing unusual about such solidarity, and it is not particular to religion or to Islam: the rise of 
transnational identities and Diaspora politics — whether they are based on religion, nationality, gender, class, ethnicity, or 
other ideology — are defining characteristics of the modern era. Al-Qaedist discourse, however, essentializes the umma 
and defines it in opposition to an equally essentialized “West,” exploiting pan-Muslim identity to propagate the idea of a 
“civilizational clash.” However flawed, the “clash” thesis is  powerful and has entered popular discourse, not least 
because such a thesis has been mirrored and defended by prominent academics and politicians in the US and Europe.64  
Among Muslims its power derives from the historical context from which it has emerged — perceived injustice over at 
least a century of relations between the European colonial powers, the US, and some Muslim-majority societies.  
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It is not surprising that pan-Muslim sentiment is aroused when co-religionists are seen to be suffering around the 
world. Global jihadist propaganda feeds off and exploits these feelings to encourage an exclusive politics of identity, an 
extreme religious transnationalism that places grievances in a simple framework of oppressed/Muslim versus 
oppressor/unbeliever and ignores the complexities of history. When al-Qaeda justifies 9/11 as “a service to Islam in 
defence of its people,”65 bin Laden refers to the miserable state of the umma and Islam under attack66 or when Mohammed 
Siddique Khan justifies the 7/7 London bombings as a defence of “my people” who daily suffer “bombing, gassing, 
imprisonment and torture” at the hands of “infidels,”67 a repeated rhetorical device is employed: injustices are identified, 
linked, and globalized; blame is assigned; and revolutionary violence is offered as a solution that demands every 
individual take up arms in a defensive and just war.68 By repeatedly linking all the conflicts in the world that involve 
Muslims into one anti-Islam conspiracy, the imagined community of the global Muslim nation is invoked within the 
framework of a powerful Manichean narrative. Fred Halliday refers to this linkage as the “rhetorical . . . political 
geography of the new Greater West Asian crisis.”69 This rhetorical landscape of Muslim suffering and oppression, 
reinforced by propaganda videos that graphically demonstrate the suffering of Muslims and in some cases desensitize the 
viewer to violence, has been, and remains, one of the most powerful recruiting tools for the al-Qaeda movement.70  
The 2003 invasion of Iraq and subsequent chaos added a new and potent symbol to the jihadi inventory of 
grievances. The power of the Iraq war to galvanize and radicalize opinion worldwide was demonstrated in the attacks on 
Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005. This is not to say that these attacks were to be explained solely in terms of the Iraq 
war but rather that it was a key factor. As the International Institute for Strategic Studies reported in 2005, “the war in Iraq 
has both intensified the jihad and eroded the ability of Western governments to fight back . . . recruitment to radical 
causes has increased.”71 This propaganda effort has been reinforced by the perception that certain well-publicized acts of 
brutality committed by coalition forces in Iraq, shocking even in the context of a war, are representative of the moral 
vacuity of “Western society.” The photographs of abuse and sexual violence at Abu Ghraib and Guantánamo Bay 
reinforced the perception among some that this behavior was representative of the nature of “Western” culture as a whole, 
which the US and its allies sought to impose upon them.72 Such feelings serve al-Qaeda’s propaganda effort and the 
spread of its portrait of a corrupt West. 
A further factor in this process of radicalization was that the mainstream Islamo-nationalist insurgency in Iraq 
allowed doctrinaire jihadis to attach themselves to a cause and movement with wide support in the Sunni Muslim world. 
Radical Sunni Islamism asserted itself in Iraq against the background of an indigenous nationalist uprising with a goal of 
national liberation from occupation and in the service of Sunni power and identity in a struggle against Shi’a (perceived as 
Iranian) dominance. The vast majority of those who made up the insurgency were native Iraqis from the Sunni 
community, uninterested in any wider ideological agenda. Their motives and grievances had roots in the US invasion and 
occupation, the ascendance of the Shi’a and Kurds as the wielders of political power, and the consequent 
disenfranchisement (real and perceived) of the Sunni Arab minority.73  
Despite widely differing goals and ideologies, the confessional flavor of the nationalist insurgency helped 
doctrinaire jihadis in Iraq and elsewhere draw on the grievances of the mainstream to legitimize their own arguments and 
actions. Indeed, the belief that the Sunni Arab insurgency in Iraq represented a justified resistance movement in the 
service of national liberation was accepted and promoted by many in the Sunni Muslim religious establishment. In this 
regard, Gerges argues that the invasion of Iraq “backfired and revived al-Qaeda after it had fallen in a coma” by 
alienating “most of the important secular and religious Muslim groups that had rejected and opposed al-Qaeda’s global 
jihad” in the wake of 9/11 and who had even given their tacit support to the US campaign to oust the Taliban in 2001.74  
Two important examples of this alienation of mainstream Sunni Muslim opinion were the fatwas of Cairo’s Al-Azhar 
University and of Sheikh Qardawi. Al-Azhar, the oldest institution of religious higher learning in the Islamic world, 
issued a fatwa advising “all Muslims in the world to make jihad against invading American soldiers,” characterizing such 
actions as “a binding religious duty.” Qardawi (another prominent Egyptian-born cleric), meanwhile, declared that “death 
while defending Iraq is a kind of martyrdom,” and even went as far as to sanction attacks on Iraqi civilians who commit 
the “crime” of assisting the occupying forces.75 These were mainstream sources with a wide audience in the Muslim 
world. With such widespread support for the traditional idea of a struggle against non-Muslim occupation in Iraq, al-
Qaeda benefited from a blurring of the divisions between their own doctrinaire struggle and the mainstream Islamo-
nationalist jihad. 
Iraq represents a recent and powerful confirmation of the “clash of civilizations” myth for many, but the idea of 
an imperial, expansionist West as the cause of all ills has an older pedigree and was as prevalent in leftist and secular 
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nationalist discourse as it is now among Islamists of all shades including jihadists. Indeed, the power and resilience of the 
“clash” myth lies in the fact that it has its roots in real historical grievances. Therefore, the broad global context of 9/11 
and similar attacks is not only one of the individualization of religious interpretation, mass population movements, and the 
strengthening of transnational identities but also of a long-standing political and economic asymmetry between Western 
and Muslim-majority societies.  
Halliday divides this period into “three superimposed periods of asymmetric relation”: European colonialism, the 
Cold War, and economic globalization.76 Although there is no space here to rehearse the historical details, we should 
highlight the enduring legacy of the colonial period (1870–1945),  especially the creation of the state system in the Middle 
East after 1918 and the many unresolved issues that have bred conflict and a sense of deep injustice ever since. These 
include the Sykes/Picot agreement, which carved up the Middle East according to the interests of the UK and France; the 
creation of the state of Israel; Israel’s relations with the Arab states; US sponsorship of Israel; the dispossession of the 
Kurdish people; and the status of Kuwait.77 Of particular importance in this rhetorical landscape of injustice is Palestine, 
which has been the major element in the symbolic politics of Islam since 1948 and especially since 1967, the year when 
Jerusalem and its Muslim holy sites were occupied by Israel.78 
As for the role of the Cold War in the rise of Islamism and its radical off-shoot jihadism, we should remember 
that it was the perceived communist threat represented by revolutionary Arab socialist governments, such as those in 
Egypt, Libya, Syria, and Iraq, and later the Islamic revolution in Iran during the Cold War period, that directly led to the 
funding and support by Saudi Arabia and other Western-allied regimes of many Islamic activist groups. In the case of 
Saudi Arabia, this effort also involved widespread evangelism of Wahhabi Islam as a way of countering secular, 
communist ideology and boosting the authority of the Saudi regime.79 Referring to the role of Islamist militias in the fight 
against the forces of communism in Afghanistan and Yemen, Halliday notes “the intimate relation between the rise of the 
armed Islamists and the crushing of the left in the Cold War.”80  
The third period of asymmetric relation that continues to the present day is economic globalization. Several 
analyses of the rise of radical Islamism frame the phenomenon as a counterpoint to the socially destabilizing effects of 
Western market dominance.81 These factors include social fragmentation, job insecurity, and the “commercialization, 
commodification and contractualization of more and more areas of human activity and relationships.”82 In some Muslim-
majority societies, the perception that such changes are intimately linked to a neo-imperialist project has led to protest 
movements by politico-religious actors who derive much of their legitimacy from manifestos that offer radical alternatives 
to “Western” prescriptions of socio-economic development.83 
As we have seen, jihadist discourse exploits the core grievances of societies in the Middle East and the wider 
Muslim world to recruit support for its campaign. But how do these grievances and the civilizational clash invoked in 
their articulations relate to the aims of the jihadi movement? Discussions of these questions often focus on a debate over 
whether al-Qaeda views itself as fighting a religious, “cosmic” war with practical politics and irrelevance and its aim as 
“the vanquishing of evil itself,” or whether it is essentially a political movement with religion as a utilitarian side-issue.84 
Such debates risk diverting attention away from the fact that jihadists view religion and politics as inseparable, and Islam 
is regarded as having “a mandate to order the whole of human life.”85 What distinguishes jihadists from other Islamists is 
not the application of religious principles to politics but rather an individual interpretation of contemporary politics — its 
ills and remedies — married to an individual interpretation of scripture. Therefore, the use of indiscriminate violence 
backed up by a good-versus-evil worldview, no matter how shocking, should not lead us to view the al-Qaeda social 
movement as apocalyptic. The language and imagery may be religious, and those who participate may believe that they 
are fulfilling heavenly edicts, but the aims and the agenda of such activity are not geared toward the end of times. On the 
contrary, radical doctrinaire jihadists have set out clearly their view of the ills of contemporary society and a strategy to 
rectify those ills. The rallying cry of the “clash of civilizations” is a not an end in itself but rather a means to an end.  
The Importance of States  
It is the roots and aims of the global jihad that draw us most strongly to local factors. Despite the global reach of 
modern Islamic radicalism, the “omnivorous” nature of its ideology, the context of globalization and the asymmetric 
relationship with the West in which it has emerged, and the religious terms in which it is articulated, the phenomenon is 
the result of a myriad of local grievances within Muslim-majority countries, especially the Arab states of the Middle East. 
Although in its most recent form this movement expresses itself globally, and many within the movement see themselves 
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as soldiers in a cosmic struggle, its roots and agenda lie locally within specific state-based societies. The transformation of 
state-based revolutionary action into a global war, therefore, represents a new path to the same destination. This shift is 
the result of two assumptions on the part of jihadist strategists: first, that the only way to achieve their long-held strategic 
objectives — the overthrow of “apostate” regimes, the installation of an Islamic state governed by their version of 
Shari’a, the defeat of Israel, and the restoration of the Caliphate — is to attack the “head of the snake,” i.e., the United 
States, and second, that the best way to achieve widespread support for, or acquiescence in, such a project is to invoke the 
image of Islam under attack.86 
Prominent jihadist writers and strategists, such as Al-Suri, Zawahiri, al-Qurashi, and al-Muqrin, have all offered 
detailed accounts of short- and long-term aims and strategies to achieve such aims, and all stress the importance of 
controlling territory and taking power.87 In his “Call to Global Islamic Resistance,” Abu Musab Al-Suri emphasizes four 
consecutive strategic goals:  
1. Expelling the Crusader and Jewish campaigns under the leadership of America and its allies; 
2. Eliminating the agent forces and hypocrites who work to achieve the goals of the invading campaigns;  
3. Overthrowing the regimes of apostasy and betrayal in our country;  
4. Establishing Shari’a on the remnants of those apostate forces.88  
Similarly, Zawahiri states the principal objective as being “a piece of land . . . on which [to] establish and protect 
the state of Islam and launch its battle to restore the rational caliphate based on the traditions of the prophet,”89 or in the 
words of bin Laden, it is the “triumph of religion and the establishment of a Muslim state . . . ruling according to revealed 
law.”90  
The strategic shift among some doctrinaire jihadists (a minority) toward targeting the United States and its allies 
and the move towards a “global” jihad in the mid-1990s represent a new path to this same objective — seizing power 
within states. This mutation reflects the widespread belief that militants, within their individual states, have been 
prevented from achieving any significant change because of US policies in the Middle East, especially its support for 
Israel and the dictatorships of the region.  
The failure of local radical Islamist insurgencies to achieve their objectives within their own states led to a new 
strategy as a way to ensure the survival of the jihadi movement. In terms of propaganda and recruitment, this would 
involve stepping onto the world stage, inviting massive media coverage, recasting its participants as defenders of Islam 
against the global tyrant, and starting a cycle of violence by provoking the US and its allies into military action in 
Muslim-majority states, thereby undermining local regimes that inevitably would be forced to side with the enemy.91 In 
terms of military strategy, the other principal goal as stated by bin Laden, is, by provoking it into a long military 
campaign, to “bleed the US economy” through attrition, forcing economic decline, “disintegration,” “contraction,” and a 
concurrent decline in financial and military aid to the “near enemy”92 or, in jihadi parlance, “killing the branches by 
attacking the trunk.”93 
Commenting on this strategy, Gilles Kepel explains the 9/11 attacks on New York and Washington as “an attempt 
to reverse a process in decline with a paroxysm of destructive violence”94 and as a realization of the myth of the “clash of 
civilizations” in 
A desperate attempt to arouse, motivate, inspire Muslims [and] above all . . .  to provoke the US into attack, to 
start a cycle of violence . . . [and thus] . . . to build universal solidarity among Muslims in reaction to the 
victimization and suffering of their Afghan brothers.95 
This thesis reflects the stated view among the theorists and founders of the global jihadist movement that al-
Qaeda would act as “a vanguard” to wake the masses96 and that only a “spectacular act could mobilize the masses.”97 By 
drawing the US into direct military intervention in Afghanistan and the Middle East, jihadists hoped to provoke massive 
popular protest, instability, and the possibility of a political space for the rise of radical Islamist power in Middle Eastern 
states — the ultimate strategic goal.98 
The failure of doctrinaire jihadist insurgents in Algeria and Libya in the wake of their participation in the Afghan-
Soviet war influenced this appraisal, as did the failed Muslim Brotherhood uprising in Syria in the 1980s.99 The most 
important state in this regard, however, is Egypt. Ideologically and organizationally, Egypt is at the epicenter of the 
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jihadist movement. Both in terms of the genesis of modern Islamism and its radical offshoot jihadism, Egypt is key. 
Despite the prominence of Osama bin Laden as a figurehead and financial backer, it is the Egyptian insurgency, the 
ideological offspring of Qutb and Faraj, that is perhaps the single most important forerunner of al-Qaeda and the al-
Qaedist movement.100 Most of the leaders of the al-Qaeda core organization are Egyptian militants with a history of 
focusing on the “near enemy,”101 whose failure in the domestic context — the break-up of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad 
organization and its subsequent ceasefire agreement with the government in 1997 — impelled the search for a new 
strategy.102 Ayman al-Zawahiri, leader of Islamic Jihad, who had been jailed in the wake of the assassination of President 
Sadat, was most influential in the decision to merge with bin Laden’s organization, becoming al-Qaeda’s number two and 
the principal contemporary ideologue of the movement.103   
Zawahiri has outlined the reasons for the strategic shift in his memoirs, stressing that, despite the operational 
redirection toward the US and its allies, the “near enemy” — the Egyptian regime — remained the ultimate target. 
Concluding that the jihadi insurgency in Egypt would always be frustrated by the nature of the easily policed terrain of the 
Nile Valley,104 al-Zawahiri says he was attracted to the mountains of Afghanistan as “a tributary and base for jihad in 
Egypt and the Arab region, the heart of the Islamic world, where the basic battle of Islam was being fought.”105 Thus, the 
1998 amalgamation of Zawahiri’s group with bin Laden’s organization and the formation of al-Qaeda represented a new 
strategy toward the same aims. The move to Afghanistan was a means of acquiring a new operational freedom (“a kind of 
laboratory . . . like an incubator where its [the jihad’s] seeds would grow and where it could acquire practical experience 
in combat, politics and organisational matters”106) and, in collaboration with bin Laden, a new global strategy to attract 
widespread support, media coverage, and to undermine the Arab regimes by hitting the United States. 
The idea that the jihadist movement’s highest priority is the overthrow of regimes in the Middle East and the 
eventual conquest of Jerusalem under the banner of Islam (and not a war against the “far enemy” — the US and its allies) 
is a belief held by the vast majority of doctrinaire jihadis today.107  Ideologically, this view reflects the writings of 
Mohammed Abd al-Salam Faraj, a disciple of Qutb and an important influence on a generation of Egyptian jihadis, 
including al-Zawahiri. Faraj argues that the “near enemy” must be prioritized because “liberating Jerusalem must be 
waged under the banner of Islam, not the internal impious leadership, lest [it] be the main beneficiary of such a victory . . . 
[and also because] . . . the colonial presence in Muslim lands is the fault of these Muslim rulers.” Faraj concludes by 
arguing that “the jihad’s first and foremost priority must be to replace these infidel rulers with a comprehensive Islamic 
system [and therefore that] any other external agenda would be a waste of time.”108 As late as 1995, Zawahiri still adhered 
to this same notion that “the road to Jerusalem goes first through Cairo” and that “the fight against apostate regimes must 
come before other fights.”109  His conversion to the notion of the global jihad should be interpreted not as an abandonment 
of this idea but rather as a different path to its fulfilment. As Gerges emphasizes, “Localism and not globalism informed 
the thinking and action of jihadis.”110 
For bin Laden, meanwhile, armed conflict with America is intimately connected to the “special relationship” 
between the Saudi regime and the US, especially since the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent US-led war 
to repel his forces.111 Indeed, it is this single issue that dominated bin Laden’s discourse in the 1990s: his “Declaration of 
Jihad” specifically targets “the Americans occupying the land of the two holy places.”112 In this sense, in the Saudi 
context, bin Laden is not an anomaly, for although the vast majority of Saudi citizens find bin Laden’s means 
reprehensible, there is substantial sympathy for his message — distaste at the US-Saudi relationship, the stationing of US 
troops on Saudi soil, US support for Israel, domestic corruption, economic inequality, and Western cultural incursion into 
the fabric of Saudi society.113 
Although bin Laden has been less explicit about the importance of the return home from exile and has promoted a 
more internationalist line than his Egyptian counterpart, the need for regime change in Saudi Arabia is a recurrent theme 
in his statements. Drawing on a long tradition of Islamist dissent in Saudi Arabia, and tapping into the widely felt 
grievances that emerged in the 1990s, bin Laden refers to the “bitter repression, [the] terrible injustice . . . [and the] . . . 
humiliating poverty” which the Saudis suffer, expressing a belief that the regime has “desecrated its legitimacy” and must 
be overthrown.114 Other stated grievances against the Saudi regime include the “betrayal” of Palestine, represented by 
their peace initiative with Israel in 2002, and the state’s crackdown on jihadi and reformist Sheiks.115 In a December 2004 
statement, bin Laden effectively calls the Saudi royal family infidels and expresses his opinion that it was the duty of 
every Muslim to overthrow them by violent means.116 He also accuses the Saudi regime of colluding with the US in the 
invasion of Iraq. Fundamentally, the struggles against the US and the Saudi regimes are viewed as the same thing. By 
targeting the United States through al-Qaeda central, and by supporting the local jihadist movement (an al-Qaeda 
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franchise organization) within the country against the regime, jihadists see themselves as involved in a double-pronged 
strategy in the Arabian Peninsula.117 But is the idea that the jihadi movement is principally concerned with seizing state 
power in Muslim-majority societies contradicted by the “freelancers” of the al-Qaeda social movement? After all, these 
jihadi operatives are people who live, and in many cases were born, in countries far from the Muslim-majority states 
where power is sought.  
Much has been made of the link between “deterritorialized” Islam — Muslims living as a minority in Western 
countries, especially in Europe — and radicalization. In the wake of 9/11 and the attacks in Madrid and London, the fact 
that many of the operatives involved had strong links with Europe — and in some cases had been born in Europe — was 
used to support the thesis that these attacks had more to do with revenge attacks in the context of an identity war than with 
revolutionary politics in Muslim-majority states, with Europe and “westernized Islam” to blame.118 However, as Alison 
Pargeter argues, this link is far from clear. Despite some evidence to suggest that the stresses of living in a minority 
culture and the fragmentation of religious authority in the Diaspora can be factors in radicalization,119 and although many 
jihadi sympathizers in Europe do appear to be motivated by the clash of civilizations myth  — “the lowest common 
denominator”120 of all jihadi ideologies —  the vast majority of jihadi operatives in Europe have had strong links to their 
country of origin (or that of their parents) and have been concerned with the internal politics of those states. Most of the 
9/11 hijackers were Saudi citizens, committed jihadists and highly religious, who, although coming together in Hamburg, 
were already in most cases committed to armed struggle before their arrival in Europe.121 Similarly, although alienation 
and marginalization were often presumed to be behind the radicalization of the second-generation Pakistani operatives 
who carried out the London attacks, the role of internal Pakistani politics and especially the issue of Kashmir have often 
been overlooked as factors in their radicalization.122 Although the call to global jihad and the exclusive identity politics 
that surround it have played a part in radicalization in some Western countries, it would be simplistic to view this as the 
sole or main cause of such radicalization. Moreover, we should also not be distracted by high-profile cases of European 
jihadis into forgetting that the majority of jihadis are young males from the core and Maghreb regions of the Arab 
world.123  
In his authoritative study of international relations in the Middle East, Fred Halliday describes the global jihadi 
movement as a “dramatic transnational expression” of a generalized “crisis of the state” in the wider Middle East (what he 
refers to as the “Greater West Asian Crisis”).124 From this perspective, as we have argued, the shift toward the “far 
enemy” and the invocation of a global jihad is symbolic and propagandistic: its primary goal is neither religious nor 
cultural but rather political. The aim is to take power from those who control states and to hold onto it: “Religious 
fundamentalism in all countries has one goal . . . to seize power, political, social and gendered, within their own 
societies,”125 or in the words of al-Zawahiri, “The foremost duty of Islam is to depose Jahiliyah from the leadership of 
man, and to take the leadership into its own hands and enforce the particular way of life which is its permanent feature.”126 
The main targets of terrorist attacks such as 9/11 are thus the “hypocritical regimes” (munafiq) so often threatened and 
condemned by bin Laden in his statements over the past 10 years.127 In a similar vein, Gerges argues that “the birth and 
evolution . . . of the jihadist movement . . . stem largely from a deep structural and developmental crisis facing the Arab 
world, in both socioeconomic and institutional terms . . . a crisis of governance and political economy.”128 The central 
dynamic of the Islamist challenge is, therefore, not a civilizational or cultural clash with the West but rather contemporary 
state/society relations in “Greater West Asia” — relations defined primarily by “the effective militarization of the 
opposition in weak states (Afghanistan/Pakistan/Yemen/Somalia) and a growing popular resentment against the governing 
elite in the major Arab states (in particular Saudi Arabia and Egypt).”129  
 
CONCLUSION 
This article has examined the structures, ideology, and aims of the al-Qaeda movement in order to explore the 
extent to which it might be described as “global.” Simplistic analyses of the type repeatedly put forward by George W. 
Bush and Tony Blair between 2001 and 2007 have served the agenda of the jihadist movement. The danger of the 
“global” analysis, especially when applied to the structures and aims of al-Qaeda, is that it reinforces the dangerous 
fallacy of the “clash of civilizations” — a jihadi recruitment tool and the lowest common denominator of all jihadi 
ideology. However, as this article has shown, it is necessary to take into account historical trends of great complexity at 
the local, regional, and global level to begin to understand this phenomenon. 
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In terms of armed groups, the “global” approach is most often used for political ends, aggregating, as it tends to, 
all armed Islamist groups into one monolithic enemy. More helpful studies analyze organizations individually and take the 
local context into account, differentiating between Islamo-nationalist groups and doctrinaire jihadis. Several 
contemporary analyses correctly focus not merely on armed organizations but rather on the wider al-Qaeda social 
movement, which has become increasingly relevant since the invasion of Iraq. This social movement is indeed a global 
phenomenon, led as it is by the collective chat-room discourse of thousands of participants across the world-wide web.  
In terms of ideology, the “omnivorous” nature of jihadi doctrine and its development led us to a broad historical 
analysis that could well be described as “global.” The broad context in which the ideology of al-Qaedism has emerged is 
dramatic social change on a global scale: modernization; two centuries of colonization and decolonization; the 
individualization of religious practice; and the advent of mass education, mass media, and mass migration across many 
Muslim-majority societies. 
When it came to the crucial discussion of the roots and aims of al-Qaeda, however, the “global” analysis came up 
short. Despite the power of the “clash of civilizations” myth, the idea of an inevitable clash between “Islam” and “the 
West” should be seen as a rhetorical device, a transnational identity myth, and a recruitment sergeant in the service of 
finite aims. The principal aim of doctrinaire jihadism, as articulated by jihadi strategists, is to seize state-power in 
Muslim-majority societies and impose “God’s law.” From this perspective, the strategic shift toward the United States and 
its allies represents a global expression of local grievances and a new global means of achieving long-held, locally based 
goals. 
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